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PAYING THE PRICE: IT’S TIME TO HOLD
MUNICIPALITIES LIABLE FOR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Gloria Jean Rottell*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recently held in Ciraolo v. New York (“Ciraolo”)1 that the City of
New York was immune from an award of punitive damages in a
§ 19832 action brought by a woman who was arrested for a
misdemeanor and subjected to an unlawful strip search of her
person.3 The city’s established policy of strip-searching all
arrestees,4 regardless of whether there was a reasonable belief

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2002; B.A., Colby College, 1998. The
author wishes to thank her family for their unconditional support and
encouragement. She also wishes to thank Professor William E. Hellerstein of
Brooklyn Law School for his helpful comments, suggestions, and discussions
on earlier drafts of this note.
1
Ciraolo v. New York, 216 F.3d 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
484 (2000).
2
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 was originally section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13. See infra Part I.A (describing § 1983
actions).
3
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242.
4
Id. at 237. In July 1996, the New York City Correction Department had
adopted “guidelines [for] the acceptance of all Police Cases for the Manhattan
Court Division, providing that [a]ll police prisoners received shall be strip
search[ed] by the officer assigned to the search post.” Id. (alterations in
original) (internal quotations omitted). In October 1996, the Executive Officer
of the Manhattan Detention Complex implemented the guidelines by sending a
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that the arrestee possessed contraband, was clearly
unconstitutional in light of the established law of the Second
Circuit.5 Despite the city’s disregard of the court’s prior decision,
the Second Circuit reversed the award of punitive damages
against the city6 based on the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (“Fact
Concerts”)7 holding that municipalities are immune from punitive
damages under § 1983.8
The result that the Second Circuit reached in Ciraolo,9 while
in accordance with precedent established by the Supreme Court,
is inconsistent with the policies and purposes underlying
§ 1983.10 In fact, the holding in Ciraolo created such
considerable cognitive dissonance in the mind of Judge Calabresi,
who wrote the majority opinion, that he was compelled to also
write a separate concurring opinion to express his concern that
“the policies and purposes underlying § 1983 would be better
furthered by a different outcome.”11
memo to all personnel ordering that, “[e]ffective immediately, all female
police prisoners arriving at this facility. . . be strip searched.” Id. at 238
(alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
5
See Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that
strip/body cavity searches of arrestees for misdemeanors or other minor
offenses violate the Fourth Amendment unless the prison officials have a
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee possesses contraband).
6
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 238. The district court had concluded that the city’s
strip search policy violated the settled law of the Second Circuit, and,
therefore, the city was liable for punitive damages. Id. The jury found that the
city acted in “wanton disregard” of Ciraolo’s rights when she was stripsearched, awarding her $5,000,000 in punitive damages in addition to
compensatory damages of $19,645. Id. at 237.
7
453 U.S. 247 (1981).
8
Id. at 271.
9
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242.
10
See infra Parts I.B-C, Parts III.A-C. With regard to municipal liability,
the policies and purposes of § 1983 have been of considerable consternation to
the Supreme Court; this is evidenced by the on-going interpretation of the
legislative history surrounding the enactment of § 1983, which has been
thoroughly examined in the leading cases involving the scope of municipal
liability. See infra note 55.
11
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242.
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While municipalities are exempt from punitive damages under
the holding of Fact Concerts,12 the Court did leave open, in
footnote number twenty-nine (“footnote 29”), the possibility that
punitive damages could be imposed on a municipality in “an
extreme situation where the taxpayers are directly responsible for
perpetrating an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights.”13 A
number of courts have considered footnote 29;14 none have opted
to uphold an award of punitive damages against a municipality.15
Moreover, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court will find
circumstances that warrant holding taxpayers directly responsible
for municipal action.16 Consequently, lower courts have found
footnote 29 to be poorly defined.17 Rather than rule counter to
precedent, these courts have barred punitive damages against
municipalities despite the exception provided for in footnote 29.18
12

Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 271.
Id. at 267 n.29. “It is perhaps possible to imagine an extreme situation
where the taxpayers are directly responsible for perpetrating an outrageous
abuse of constitutional rights. Nothing of that kind is presented by this case.
Moreover, such an occurrence is sufficiently unlikely that we need not
anticipate it here.” Id.
14
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 240 (finding that footnote 29, rather than being a
general exception, provides an exception only for outrageous abuses for which
the taxpayers are directly responsible); Webster v. Houston, 689 F.2d 1220,
1229 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that footnote 29 provides an exception only for
particularly egregious violations of constitutional rights), rev’d on other
grounds, 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Heritage Homes of
Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water Dist., 670 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1982)
(concluding that the taxpayers were not directly responsible, under footnote
29, because only a small number of taxpayers violated the constitutional rights
of the housing developer).
15
See cases cited supra note 14.
16
The Supreme Court did not provide a test or an adequate means of
assessing when the taxpayers would be directly responsible for municipal
action. See Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29 (stating that a situation that
would fall under this footnote was not before the Court and so unlikely that it
required no further discussion).
17
See cases cited supra note 14. The three circuit courts that have
analyzed footnote 29 have based their conclusions on different interpretations
of the footnote. See supra note 14.
18
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242; Webster, 689 F.2d at 1229; Heritage Homes,
13
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The absolute immunity from punitive damages that
municipalities enjoy is detrimental to the protection of
constitutional rights under § 1983 and fails to be meaningfully
justified.19 To comport with the intent of § 1983, the Court
should, at the very least, reconsider the scope of municipal
immunity from punitive damages. Even under the most
conservative reading of § 1983, a city that knowingly violates the
clearly established law of its judicial circuit should be held liable
for punitive damages.
Part I of this note examines how the Supreme Court has
interpreted the legislative history behind § 1983 municipal
liability and the consequences of the “impenetrable barrier to
punitive damages”20 established by the Court in Fact Concerts.21
Part II analyzes the meaning of footnote 29, details the Fact
Concerts decision, and then discusses the Court’s intent in
creating an exception to municipal immunity from punitive
damages.22 Part II also examines the policy reasons that support a
more liberal reading of footnote 29. Through an analysis of case
law,23 Part III of this note demonstrates how the precedent
established in Fact Concerts has created unintended consequences
for subsequent litigants. The section concludes that, while the
Court correctly decided Fact Concerts, it erred in creating such a
broad holding that threatens the intent of § 1983.24 As a means of
upholding the purpose of § 1983, Part IV proposes two ways for
the Supreme Court to rework footnote 29. Finally, Part V
suggests that the rationale for the barrier to punitive damages,
which supports the outcome in Fact Concerts, does not support
670 F.2d at 3.
19
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 250 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Webster, 689
F.2d at 1237 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring) (arguing that in certain cases
failure to impose punitive damages on municipalities undermines the policies
of § 1983).
20
Webster, 689 F.2d at 1231 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring).
21
See discussion infra Parts I.B, Parts III.A-C.
22
See discussion infra Part II.
23
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 236; Webster, 689 F.2d at 1220; Heritage Homes,
670 F.2d at 1.
24
See discussion infra Parts I.A-C, II, III.A-C.
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the holdings of the subsequent cases.25
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF § 1983
A. An Overview

Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871,26 also known
as the “Ku Klux Klan Act,”27 at the urging of President Grant.28
The legislative intent behind the Act was to provide broad federal
remedies to people who were deprived of their constitutional
rights,29 in particular, their right to equal protection.30 While the
25

Webster, 689 F.2d at 1231-32 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring).
I am in agreement with the Supreme Court in Newport not only in
regard to rationale and result, but also in regard to the Court’s overall
approach to section 1983. What disturbs me is that the very
methodology and rationale that dictate the result in Newport dictate a
contrary result now.
Id.
26

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
See S. Rep. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. The Civil Rights Act of 1871
was commonly referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act because it was enacted in
response to the wave of Klan violence at the time. Id.
28
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871). On March 23, 1871,
President Grant sent a message to Congress reading:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union
rendering life and property insecure and the carrying of the mails and
the collection of the revenue dangerous. The proof that such a
condition of affairs exists in some localities is now before the Senate.
That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State
authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive of the
United States, acting within the limits of existing laws, is sufficient
for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore, I urgently
recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall
effectually secure life, liberty and property, and the enforcement of
law in all parts of the United States.
Id.
29
CONG. GLOBE, App. at 81. In the words of Representative Bingham,
the author of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the purpose of the Act
is to “enforc[e] . . . the Constitution on behalf of every individual citizen of
27
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Klu Klux Klan had engaged in a reign of terror in the southern
states,31 the state and local authorities either participated in the
violence against the “loyal Republicans and freedmen”32 or did
nothing to stop it from occurring.33 The Act was a legislative
response to this failure of state and local governments to protect

the Republic . . . to the extent of the rights guaranteed to him by the
Constitution.” Id. Furthermore, the remedial nature of the Act led to the
sentiment of liberal construction. See GLOBE. App. at 68 (1 Story on
Constitution, sec. 429). Even opponents of section 1 of the Act thought that it
was to be far reaching. Monell, 436 U.S. at 686. Senator Thurman, who
critiqued the Act found that “[there] is no limitation whatsoever upon the
terms that are employed [in the bill], and they are as comprehensive as can be
used .” CONG. GLOBE. App. at 217. See, e.g., CONG GLOBE. App. at 50,
160, 179, 216 (citing comments made by Mr. Kerr of Indiana, Mr. Golladay
of Tennessee, Mr. Voorhees of Indiana, and Senator Thurman of Ohio,
respectfully opposing the Act because of the breadth of the remedy provided).
30
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The Civil Rights Act of
1871 was passed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Id. It reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding
for redress.
Id.
31
See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing the inability of
many Southern states to ensure enforcement of the law due to the Klu Klux
Klan’s unbridled dominion of violence).
32
Ken Ballen, Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The
Meaning of “Policy or Custom,” 79 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 308 (1979).
33
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961). The Court wrote:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to
afford a federal right in the federal courts, because by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might
not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights,
privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
might be denied by the state agencies.
Id.
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the constitutional rights of their citizens.34 Furthermore, the Act
was to serve as a judicial remedy to citizens who were denied
equal protection by their states.35
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act, now codified as § 1983,
passed with almost no legislative debate and without
amendment.36 While other sections of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 were being considered,37 Senator John Sherman of Ohio
proposed an amendment38 to the Act (the “Sherman
Amendment”) that would hold municipalities “liable to pay full
compensation to the person or persons damnified [by certain acts
of violence] if living, or to his widow or legal representative if
dead.”39 Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment, however,
because of its expansive view of municipal liability.40 While not
intending to alter § 1983,41 the amendment is relevant in
34

Id. at 176 (comments of Senator Osborn):
That the State courts in the several States have been unable to enforce
the criminal laws of their respective States or to suppress the
disorders existing, and in fact that the preservation of life and
property in many sections of the country is beyond the power of the
State government, is a sufficient reason why Congress should, so far
as they have authority under the Constitution, enact the laws
necessary for the protection of citizens of the United States.

Id.
35

CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 459 (1871) (stating the remarks of
Rep. Coburn).
36
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 522 (1871).
37
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180-81 (indicating that section 2 in particular
created great controversy).
38
The Sherman Amendment, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663
(1871).
39
Id.
40
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)
(indicating that the amendment was rejected by Congress because it imposed
liability on municipalities for the wrongs of a few private citizens even if the
municipality had “done everything in its power” to prevent the unlawful acts);
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 264 (“It was generally understood that the extent
of the proposed public liability went beyond what was contemplated under §
1.”).
41
Monell, 436 U.S. at 666 (stating that the Sherman Amendment was to
be added to the end of the bill as section 7). The Sherman Amendment was
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considering the legislative intent regarding the constitutionality of
congressionally imposed civil liability on municipalities.42
According to Senator George Edmunds, who was then Senate
Manager of the Act and Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, municipalities are bound by the duty of protection
that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on states.43 While
Congress defeated the Sherman Amendment primarily because it
imposed vicarious liability on municipalities,44 nothing in the
adopted by the Senate. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 704-05 (1871).
However, it did not pass in the House. Id. at 725.
42
The Supreme Court has analyzed the Sherman Amendment as a means
to determine the legislative intent behind § 1983 because § 1983 was passed
with little debate. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190 (concluding that Congress
excluded municipal corporations from the coverage of section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act based on the House’s rejection of the Sherman Amendment);
Monell, 436 U.S. at 682 (overruling Monroe insofar as it held municipalities
immune from liability under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act based on a fresh
interpretation of the Sherman Amendment); Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 265
(reasoning that, based on Congress’ rejection of permitting punitive damage
awards against municipalities in the context of the Sherman Amendment,
punitive damage awards are also forbidden under § 1983). See generally Owen
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (holding that municipalities
have no immunity from damages resulting from their constitutional violations
under § 1983).
43
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 459 (1871). Senator Edmunds
stated:
[The Fourteenth Amendment] which speaks to the protection which
the States must afford to all their inhabitants equally under the
law . . . does speak . . . to municipal authorities existing under State
law directly; and when, therefore, they fail to perform the duty of
protection, which the theory of this law implies that they are bound to
perform . . . then the Constitution has declared that Congress, by
appropriate legislation, may apply to them the duty of making
reimbursement.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 756-57 (1871). See also Monell, 436
U.S. at 690 (“Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other
local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983
applies.”).
44
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-95 (indicating that while the proponents of
the Sherman Amendment viewed it as only coming “into play when a locality
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legislative history of the Amendment mitigated the duty that the
Act imposed on local governments to protect “persons” subject to
their coverage.45 The rejection of the Sherman Amendment,
therefore, does not alter the municipality’s responsibility to
protect its citizens from a denial of equal protection.46
Furthermore, the rejection of the Amendment suggests that
Congress, in enacting section 1 of § 1983, did not impose a
prerequisite that the state or municipality act with the intent to
deprive someone of a constitutional right.47 Thus, Congress’
major objectives in enacting § 1983 were twofold. First, it
intended to impose an obligation on state and local governments
to protect the already existing rights of its citizens.48 Second, it
sought to create an affirmative duty on the states to protect its
citizens by stating that denial of equal protection and any failures
to proactively protect its citizens’ rights violate the Act.49
Therefore, the legislative history of § 1983 supports the
was at fault or had knowingly neglected its duty to provide protection,” other
proponents, and ultimately Congress, viewed it as a means to vicariously hold
municipalities liable for the unlawful acts of local citizens).
45
Ballen, supra note 32, at 315.
46
See Ballen, supra note 32, at 314. There is no indication that there was
any debate over the validity of Senator Edmund’s statement regarding
municipal obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment when the Sherman
Amendment was rejected. See Ballen, supra note 32, at 314.
47
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 755 (1871). The existence of a
specified intent requirement, that the rioters have acted “with the intent to
deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution” in the
rejected Sherman Amendment, indicates Congress would have included a
similar provision in § 1983 if it desired to do so. Id. See also Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-26 (1968) (supporting the proposition that
Congress would provide a specific requirement with express language had that
been its desire, and, therefore additional requirements should not be read into
the Act); Eric Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 213, 242 (1979) (noting that the legislative history of § 1983 indicates
that “except as to certain specific provisions, Congress attached no importance
to the intent involved”).
48
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was entitled “An Act to enforce The Provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .” Id.
49
Ballen, supra note 32, at 313.
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proposition that, when a municipality disregards a prior ruling by
its own judicial circuit, it should be held liable.
B. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of § 1983
The legislative history of § 1983 suggests an overarching
policy; statutes that are meant to protect and remedy wrongs to
people should be liberally construed.50 Senator Edmunds stated
the following:
The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to, as
defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the
United States when they are assailed by any State law or
under the color of any State law, and it is merely carrying
out the principles of the civil rights bill, which has since
become a part of the Constitution.51
In enacting § 1983, the legislature had three main goals: to
override any state legislation endangering the constitutional rights
and privileges of the citizens of the United States;52 to provide a
“remedy where state law was inadequate;”53 and “to provide a
federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in
theory, was not available in practice.”54
The Supreme Court has thoroughly analyzed the legislative
history behind the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to
determine whether municipal liability exists under § 1983.55 This
50

Monell, 436 U.S. at 684 (according to Representative Shellabarger, the
courts would and should interpret section 1 with a broad effect).
51
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871). The civil rights bill
referred to by Senator Edmunds is the Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27. This
bill became part of the Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment.
52
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 174.
55
See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 168-92 (discussing the legislative
history of § 1983 explicitly throughout its twenty-four page opinion); Monell,
436 U.S. at 660-702 (conducting a renewed analysis of § 1983 leading to the
Court’s overruling of Monroe insofar as it holds local governments wholly
immune from suit under § 1983); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 635 (1980) (noting the necessity to conduct an analysis of the “language
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process, however, has not been easy. In 1961, Monroe v. Pape56
raised the question of whether the forty-second Congress
intended to include municipalities within the ambit of § 1983.57
The Court concluded that because the Sherman Amendment,
which proposed municipal liability, received such an
“antagonistic”58 response from Congress and was rejected for this
reason,59 Congress could not have intended the word “person,”60
as used in the Act, to include municipalities.61 Seventeen years
of the statute itself” to determine the scope of a municipality’s immunity from
liability under § 1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247
(1981) (examining the common-law background and policy considerations of
§ 1983); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 813 (1985) (declaring that
“[a]lthough this Court has decided a host of cases under [§ 1983] in recent
years, it can never hurt to embark on statutory construction” prior to deciding
the question of whether “a single isolated incident of the use of excessive force
by a police officer establishes an official policy or practice of a municipality
sufficient to render the municipality liable for damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983”); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (basing its
opinion on the “principles underlying § 1983” to conclude that a municipality
is equally responsible under § 1983 whether a particular course of action
directed by those who establish governmental policy is to be undertaken only
once or to be taken repeatedly).
56
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
57
Id. at 170.
58
Id. at 191.
59
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1871). Mr. Poland, speaking
about the Sherman Amendment’s proposal to hold municipalities liable, stated:
“We informed the conferees on the part of the Senate that the House had taken
a stand on that subject and would not recede from it; that that section imposing
liability upon towns and counties must go out or we should fail to agree.” Id.
60
See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191. The Court explained that Senator
Sherman proposed the Sherman Amendment while the Act of April 20, 1871
was being debated in Congress. Id. at 188. While Congress was debating this
amendment, they relied on the Act of February 25, 1871, entitled “An Act
prescribing the Form of the enacting and resolving Clauses of Acts and
Resolutions of Congress, and Rules for the Construction thereof” for a
definition of the word “person.” Id. at 190. Section 2 of the Act of February
25, 1871 provided that a permissible, but not mandatory definition of the word
“person” “extend[ed] and [could] be applied to bodies politic and corporate.”
Id. at 191.
61
Id. (concluding that “[t]he response of the Congress to the proposal to
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later, in Monell v. Department of Social Services,62 the Supreme
Court re-examined the legislative history behind § 1983 and
overruled Monroe.63 The Court concluded that the Monroe Court
misunderstood the meaning of the Act,64 thereby suggesting the
possibility of municipal remedies for § 1983 violations.65 The
holding of Monell, however, did not directly address this issue;
thus, the question remained open.66 Finally, in 1981, the Court
addressed the issue of whether municipalities could be held liable
for punitive damages in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.67
It held, after an analysis of the legislative history behind
§ 1983,68 that municipalities are immune from punitive
damages.69
C. Fact Concerts:70 The Impenetrable Barrier to Punitive
make municipalities liable for certain actions being brought within federal
purview of the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot
believe that the word ‘person’ was used in [§ 1983] to include them”).
62
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
63
Monell, 436 U.S. at 664-89. Monell overrules Monroe insofar as
Monroe held that local governments are not “persons” and are immune from
suits under § 1983. Id.
64
Monell, 436 U.S. at 700-01. The Court stated:
It is simply beyond doubt that, under the 1871 Congress’ view of the
law, were section 1983 liability unconstitutional as to local
governments, it would have been equally unconstitutional as to state
officers. . . . [T]here can be no doubt that section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed,
against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights.
Therefore, absent a clear statement [to the contrary] there is no
justification for excluding municipalities from the “persons” covered
by section 1.
Id.
65
Id.
66
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 664-89; see generally Ballen, supra note 32
(describing the elusiveness of the Court’s decision and proposing a model of
municipal liability).
67
453 U.S. 247 (1981).
68
See discussion infra Part I.C.
69
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 271.
70
453 U.S. 247 (1981).
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Damages
In an action brought under § 1983, Fact Concerts, Inc., a
musical concert promoter, sued the City of Newport, Rhode
Island for a violation of its First Amendment rights.71 Fact
Concerts, Inc. had obtained permission from the Rhode Island
Department of Natural Resources to present several jazz concerts
at a state park in Newport.72 When a regularly scheduled
performer was unable to appear at the concert, Fact Concerts
engaged the group Blood, Sweat and Tears as a replacement. The
Newport City Council attempted to prevent Blood, Sweat and
Tears from performing because it feared the band would attract a
rowdy audience to the city.73 Although the concert went on,
ticket sales were significantly lower due to the media attention
covering the city council’s vote to cancel the contract.74 Fact
Concerts, Inc., therefore, sued the city to recover lost ticket
profits. At the conclusion of a six day trial in district court, the
jury awarded Fact Concerts $200,000 in punitive damages
against the city, as well as damages from the individuals
involved.75
The City of Newport moved for a new trial, arguing that
§ 1983 prevents the assessment of punitive damages against a
municipality, and in the alternative, that the award was
excessive.76 The district court proceeded to consider the merits of
the city’s arguments.77 It concluded, however, that municipal
liability was appropriate under the circumstances presented.78 The
71

Id. at 252 (alleging, inter alia, “that the license cancellation amounted
to content-based censorship, and that its constitutional rights to free expression
and due process had been violated under color of state law”).
72
Id. at 249-50.
73
Id. at 250.
74
Id. at 251.
75
Id. at 253. The rest of the punitive damages awarded, amounting to
$75,000, was spread among the seven individual officials. Id.
76
Id. at 253.
77
Id. at 253-54.
78
Id. at 254. The court noted, however, that caution was warranted in this
area because of the burden that would be imposed on the taxpayers. Id. It also
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court of appeals, unable to find any appellate decisions that had
barred punitive damage awards against municipalities, affirmed
the district court’s decision.79
The question presented to the Supreme Court on certiorari
was whether a municipality could be held liable for punitive
damages under § 1983.80 The Supreme Court analyzed the claim
of municipal liability using a “two part approach.”81 First, it
considered the legislative history relevant to § 1983 and the
common law pertaining to municipal liability for punitive
damages.82 Second, it evaluated the policies behind punitive
damages and the relevancy and relation of those policies to
§ 1983. Finally, it concluded that municipalities are immune
from punitive damages under § 1983.83
In assessing the legislative history, the Court compared the
treatment of private corporations and municipalities under
common law.84 According to the Court, in 1871 municipalities
and private corporations were both subject to suits for tortious
conduct and were required to pay compensatory damages if found
concluded that the $200,000 award of damages was excessive and it ordered a
remittitur, reducing the punitive damages to $75,000. Id.
79
Fact Concerts, 626 F.2d 1060 (1980). The court noted the “distinct
possibility that municipalities, like all other persons subject to suit under §
1983, may be liable for punitive damages in the proper circumstance.” Id. at
1067.
80
Id. at 254.
81
Id. at 258-59. The Court has applied this “two-part approach” since it
decided Monell. Id.
82
Id. at 258-59.
83
Id. at 271. The Court stated:
In sum, we find that considerations of history and policy do not
support exposing a municipality to punitive damages for the bad-faith
actions of its officials. Because absolute immunity from such damages
obtained at common law and was undisturbed by the 42d Congress,
and because that immunity is compatible with both the purposes of §
1983 and general principles of public policy, we hold that a
municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
Id.
84
Id. at 259-71.
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liable.85 Courts were, and continue to be, however, disinclined to
subject either entity to punitive damages.86 Absent a specific
congressional provision altering the common-law scheme,
however, the Court concluded that § 1983 similarly barred
punitive damages.87 Furthermore, the Court looked to the
Sherman Amendment, which only provided compensatory
damages for injuries sustained from acts of mob violence.88 It
reasoned that since Congress did not intend to permit punitive
damage awards against municipalities in the Amendment, it
would not have meant to impose them “sub silentio under § 1 of
the Act.”89
Additionally, the legislative history of section 190 indicated
Congress’ concern that local governments would not be able to
support the financial burden an assessment of punitive damages
would impose upon them.91 Congress also indicated that punitive
damages would unjustly punish taxpayers for actions taken by
other persons.92 The Court concluded that the legislative history
surrounding § 1983 and the common law of 1871 suggest that
compensatory damages, not punitive damages, are appropriately
awarded against a municipality when it has committed a wide
range of tortious activity.93
Since Congress did not intend to alter the common law
85

Id. at 259.
Id. at 260 n.21.
87
Id. Cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (determining that if
Congress had intended to abolish punitive damages it would have done so
explicitly).
88
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 264.
89
Id. at 265.
90
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
91
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 795 (1871) (comments of
Representative Blair) (arguing that the obligations imposed by the amendment
might “utterly destroy the municipality”). See also Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at
265.
92
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 266 (citing the remarks of Senator
Stevenson who feared that the amendment “under[took] to create a corporate
liability for personal injury which no prudence or foresight could have
prevented”); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 762 (1871).
93
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 259-61.
86
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scheme when it enacted § 1983, the Court then looked to see if
public policy considerations should override Congress’ intent.94
The purposes underlying punitive damages are twofold: to punish
the “tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or
malicious, and to deter him and others from similar extreme
conduct.”95 The Court easily dismissed the retributive goal of
punitive damages because the tortfeasor would not be made to
suffer from his unlawful actions96 and the innocent taxpayers
would instead foot the bill.97
Next, the Court examined the rationale of § 1983 in relation
to the deterrent objective of punitive damages. It rejected
respondent’s argument that the deterrent purpose of § 1983
would be fulfilled by assessing “[p]unitive damages awards
against municipalities for the malicious conduct of their
policymaking officials [by inducing] voters to condemn official
misconduct through the electoral process, [so that] the threat of
such awards [would] deter future constitutional violations.”98
Instead, the Court found it uncertain that policymaking or other
municipal officials would be deterred if the city were to pay such
damages.99 Superiors, the Court believed, would take corrective
94

Id. at 266-70.
Id. at 266-67. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 38-55 (1983) (concluding that there is no reason to depart from the common law standard of
assessing punitive damages in a § 1983 action); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908 (1979); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 9-10 (4th ed. 1971).
96
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 (emphasizing the importance of
punishing the wrongdoer for his unlawful conduct and noting that punitive
damages assessed against a municipality fail to serve the retributive goal
because “[a] municipality . . . can have no malice independent of the malice of
its officials”).
97
Id. (stating that punitive damages “are likely accompanied by an
increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for the citizens footing the
bill,” even though they did not participate in the commission of the tort).
98
Id. at 269.
99
Id. The Court has also noted that damages assessed against an
individual are more likely to deter conduct than the threat of damages against a
municipality. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) (stating that
“responsible superiors are motivated not only by concern for the public fisc
but also by concern for the Government’s integrity”).
95
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action against the offending officials even without the assessment
of punitive damages.100 Finally, the Court expressed its concern
that municipalities would become financially unstable if held
liable for such damages.101 As such, it concluded that policy does
not warrant an abandonment of municipal immunity.102
The Court, however, left open the opportunity for an award
of punitive damages in footnote 29 by suggesting that, perhaps in
extreme situations, punitive damages are appropriate. This
footnote indicates that the barrier to punitive damages may not be
impenetrable, after all.
II. ANALYSIS OF FOOTNOTE 29103
Footnote 29 of Fact Concerts reads as follows: “It is perhaps
possible to imagine an extreme situation where the taxpayers are
directly responsible for perpetrating an outrageous abuse of
constitutional rights. Nothing of that kind is presented by this
case. Moreover, such an occurrence is sufficiently unlikely that
we need not anticipate it here.”104 The circuit courts are split in
their interpretation of these words. Their divergent views suggest
the need for review of the Supreme Court’s intent behind the
footnote, and concise examples of the situations that would
trigger liability. The First and Second Circuits, in analyzing the
application of footnote 29, have focused on the taxpayers’
involvement in the unlawful action.105 In contrast, the Fifth

100

Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 268-69.
Id. at 270. When juries determine the size of a punitive damage award,
they are allowed to consider the size and wealth of the municipality. Id. The
Court expressed concern that this would lead to unpredictable and large
punitive damage assessments. Id. These factors could strain the local treasuries
and negatively impact innocent citizens who would be deprived of other
services otherwise available to them. Id. at 271.
102
Id. at 271.
103
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29.
104
Id.
105
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241 (finding that the taxpayers cannot be held
responsible when an “unconstitutional policy has been adopted by municipal
officials without any clear endorsement of the policy by the electorate”);
101
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Circuit has focused more on the outrageousness of the
constitutional abuse rather than the taxpayers’ responsibility for
the incident.106 Despite conflicting methods of interpretation,
subsequent courts have uniformly taken an inflexible approach to
the precedent established in Fact Concerts and have declined to
apply footnote 29 in order to create an exception to its sweeping
holding.107
It is argued that the Court would not have created footnote 29
if it had not intended to create an exception to municipal
immunity from punitive damages.108 While the circumstances in
Fact Concerts clearly did not present an appropriate situation for
the assessment of punitive damages against the municipality,
other fact patterns do call for it.109 Certainly, a contractual breach
Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d at 2 (analyzing the reality of deterrence by the
number of taxpayers in the Seekonk Water District compared to the number of
taxpayers who actually participated in the crucial meeting).
106
Webster, 689 F.2d at 1229 (“The plight of Randy Webster, however
reprehensible, however tragic, does not rise to the level of outrageous
conduct. . . . [W]e believe that it would take a far more serious violation than
that we confront to ground punitive damages against Houston.”).
107
See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d 236; Webster, 689 F.2d 1220; Heritage Homes,
670 F.2d 1. It has been argued that footnote 29 is not an exception, rather it
precludes an exception. Webster, 689 F.2d at 1231 (Goldberg, J., specially
concurring).
108
Myriam E. Gilles, Symposium, In Defense of Making Government
Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV.
845, 871-75 (2001) (agreeing with Judge Calabresi’s concurring opinion in
Ciraolo and arguing that the assessment of punitive damages against a
municipality is necessary “to cause the municipality to internalize the full
social costs of its unconstitutional policy or custom”). The Supreme Court,
when referring to punitive damages imposed on a municipality, could simply
have stated “[n]either reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should
be visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers.” Fact
Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267. However, instead of ending its analysis there, in
footnote 29 the Court went on to hypothesize about a possible situation where
it would be appropriate to impose punitive damages on a municipality. Id. at
267 n.29. Thus, the mere presence of the footnote indicates that it be
construed as an exception to municipal immunity from punitive damages.
109
See infra Part III.A-C (analyzing three cases where punitive damage
awards should have been assessed against municipalities, but were denied
based on the holding in Fact Concerts).
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resulting in a violation of First Amendment rights is not an
“extreme situation” where an assessment of punitive damages
would be proper.110 Only a few taxpayers were members of the
city council that voted for the cancellation; therefore, punitive
damages would have likely burdened innocent taxpayers.111
Moreover, while Fact Concerts, Inc. suffered a loss in ticket
sales due to the adverse publicity,112 this loss could not be said to
constitute “an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights.”113 These
facts aside, footnote 29 should be interpreted in the spirit of
§ 1983, as a means to deter municipalities from constitutional
violations in cases with exceptional fact patterns.114
The consequences of municipal immunity are detrimental to
citizens whose constitutional rights have been violated and
threaten to subvert the utility of § 1983 actions. An examination
of the cases in which subsequent courts have declined to apply
footnote 29 highlights the inequity of the holding in Fact
Concerts to other litigants.
III. IMPACT OF FACT CONCERTS
In its holding in Fact Concerts, the Court effectively barred

110

Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29. The fact that the Court created
footnote 29 stating that “[i]t is perhaps possible to image an extreme situation,
[however,] [n]othing of that kind is presented by this case,” suggests that the
facts of Fact Concerts do not warrant punitive damages assessed against the
municipality. Id. See generally Webster, 689 F.3d at 1231-38 (Goldberg, J.,
specially concurring).
111
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 250-52.
112
Id. at 252. The adverse publicity resulted in less than half the tickets
for the concert being sold. Id.
113
Id. at 267 n.29.
114
Webster, 689 F.2d at 1229. The majority opinion in Webster
interpreted Fact Concerts as allowing punitive damages to be assessed against
a city in an outrageous case. Id. But see Webster, 689 F.2d at 1231-38
(Goldberg. J., specially concurring) (suggesting that Fact Concerts has created
an absolute bar to an assessment of punitive damages against a city). See also
infra Part IV (proposing two ways for the Supreme Court to rework footnote
29 to insure that the purpose of § 1983 is upheld).
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punitive damages against municipalities in any future case.115 The
result of this holding has been far reaching and has created
situations where there is no redress for people whose
constitutional rights have been knowingly violated. In subsequent
cases, appellate courts have been forced, under the precedent set
forth in Fact Concerts, to bar punitive damages assessed against
municipalities even when the results are incongruous with the
plain meaning of § 1983.116
Other courts have applied the rule established in Fact
Concerts to more inequitable factual situations than the relatively
unoffensive conduct of the Newport officials.117 In fact, the
115

Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 271. See also, Webster, 689 F.2d at 123031 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring).
116
See, e.g., Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242 (citing Fact Concerts as the
constraining precedent for its reversal of a punitive damages award assessed
against a municipality for a Fourth Amendment violation); Webster, 689 F.2d
at 1229 (reversing the trial court’s verdict imposing punitive damages on the
city based on the precedent established in Fact Concerts); Heritage Homes,
670 F.2d at 2 (reversing the district court’s judgment awarding punitive
damages against the Seekonk Water District in light of the Fact Concerts
decision).
117
Examples of factual situations that command one’s attention are those
found in Ciraolo, Webster, and Heritage Homes. In each of these cases, the
city’s officials participated in clearly unconstitutional conduct by adopting a
policy that it unquestionably knew, or should have known, would violate the
Fourth Amendment by strip-searching all arrestees brought to the police
station regardless of whether there was probable cause to believe they
possessed contraband, by encouraging a policy of using “throw down”
weapons to conceal police errors, and by taxpayers voting for the exclusion of
a housing developer from access to water based on racist motivations. See
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2000); Webster, 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir.
1982); Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982). Judge Goldberg, in
Webster, noted the extreme differences in factual situations when he contrasted
the facts in Fact Concerts (referred to below as Newport):
In Newport the challenged activity was an ad hoc decision; here it is a
widely followed municipal policy. In Newport there were specifically
identifiable wrongdoers; here it is impossible to point to any person
or persons responsible for the offending policy. In Newport the very
nature of the wrong makes it public, whereas here the very nature of
the wrong tends towards concealment. Finally, in Newport the
consequence of the wrong was lost ticket sales; here it is needlessly,
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breadth of the Fact Concerts holding has forced lower courts to
grant immunity to municipalities in circumstances not
contemplated by the Court.118 Based on the fact pattern before it,
the Court rightly concluded that the City of Newport should not
be subjected to punitive damages. When applied to cases with
different and compelling fact patterns, however, blanket
municipal immunity from punitive damages undermines the
policies behind § 1983 and, thus, should lead the Court to
overcome this presumption.
A. Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water
District119
In Heritage Homes, the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied
the imposition of punitive damages against the Seekonk Water
District, a municipal corporation under state law, even though
taxpayers in the district had voted in favor of excluding a housing
developer from access to water due to his willingness to sell

tragically, lost life.
Webster, 689 F.2d at 1233.
118
See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241; Webster, 689 F.2d at 1229; Heritage
Homes, 670 F.2d at 3. Ciraolo, Webster, and Heritage Homes each cited to
Fact Concerts as the basis for reversing the lower court’s award of punitive
damages. See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241 (“[D]espite what might be the salutary
effects of punitive damages in a case such as this, we are constrained by the
Supreme Court’s holding in [Fact Concerts] to reverse the award of punitive
damages.”); Webster, 689 F.2d at 1229 (“The plight of Randy Webster,
however reprehensible, however tragic, does not rise to the level of
outrageous conduct to which Justice Blackmun [in Fact Concerts] referred.”);
Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d at 3 (finding that the court was “not only bound by
the holding of Fact Concerts but it must also defer to its reasoning”).
However, each of those cases noted the seeming inadequacy of applying the
broad holding in Fact Concerts to factual situations presented before them. In
his concurring opinion in Webster, Judge Goldberg noted that “a policy under
which policemen are permitted literally to get away with murder by
perpetrating a fraud in a subsequent investigation is more offensive to the
principles of section 1983 than is a municipal breach of a contract for a
concert site that results in lost ticket sales.” Webster, 689 F.2d at 1235.
119
670 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982).
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houses to black families.120 The First Circuit had previously
upheld the district court’s award of punitive damages but was
compelled to reverse that aspect of its decision in light of Fact
Concerts.121 The policy that the taxpayers in Heritage Homes had
voted for was unquestionably unconstitutional and had followed
“blatantly racist discussions.”122 Nonetheless, the court analyzed
footnote 29 to the letter, focusing only on the taxpayers involved
in the unconstitutional action.123 It reasoned that since only a
minority of the members participated in this vote, it would not be
fair to assess punitive damages against the municipality and to
punish those taxpayers who did not vote for this particular
policy.124
120

Id. at 3.
648 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1981), on remand, 670 F.2d 1 (1982)
(reversing the district court’s award of punitive damages against the Seekonk
Water District, a municipal corporation under state law).
122
Id. at 2; see, e.g., Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk
Water District, 498 F. Supp. 463 (D. Mass. 1980). At the Seekonk Water
District meeting, in which a motion to include the property of Heritage Homes
in the water district was raised, the gist of conversations between the voters
discussing among themselves the Heritage Homes project was as follows:
[T]he project would bring in black people from nearby East
Providence; that Water District members would have to sell their
houses at a loss because they didn’t want colored people in Seekonk;
and that the subdivision must be stopped if the voters were to protect
the value of their property.
Id. at 465. During the floor discussion, the following occurred:
One speaker said that he understood that the houses proposed by
Heritage Homes would bring black people to the area. Another man
asked where the builder was. When DesVergnes [the builder]
understandably hesitated to identify himself the man demanded to see
the builder who planned “to put up this low income housing in this
town.” DesVergnes then stood up . . . he was asked by the same
voter “What kind of shacks are you going to build in this town?”
Id. at 466. After the meeting, another voter (who did not recognize
DesVergnes) said to him “if we don’t stop this thing here tonight . . . you will
have all the niggers in town.” Id.
123
Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d at 2.
124
Id. at 4. The court stated that “[t]he actions of a small claque of voters
would burden several thousand non-participants, many of whom presumably
121
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Heritage Homes exemplifies the difficulties courts must face
as a result of the vague nature of footnote 29. The court sought,
but was unable to discern, how to assess taxpayer responsibility
for an unconstitutional action.125 It commented that “[t]he exact
number of members of the District is not crucial to our holding,
though this might be a different case were there only 100
members instead of several thousand.”126 The fact that only a
small number of taxpayers were culpable troubled the court. An
award of punitive damages would burden many taxpayers
“unaware of the entire controversy.”127 In addition, the definition
of a knowing and culpable taxpayer was unclear from the Fact
Concerts decision.128 Therefore, the court lacked guidelines to
determine when an award of punitive damages would be a
successful deterrent.129 Since the scope of footnote 29 was poorly
were unaware of the entire controversy.” Id.
125
Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d at 2. The court struggled to determine when
to hold a taxpayer responsible:
If the theory is that most of the taxpayers knew that a group of voters
intended to discriminate but wanted to disassociate themselves by
staying away from the meeting, this raises a number of troubling
questions. How much did they know? How serious was the threat?
When must a citizen or taxpayer attend a meeting or remain away,
vote or abstain, at his or her peril?
Id.
126
Id. at 2 n.1.
127
Id. at 2 (“Absent widespread knowledgeable participation by taxpayers,
the analogy to municipal officials seems apt: to award punitive damages
against the Water District would not serve the purposes of punishment or
deterrence.”).
128
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29. The Court simply stated that
“where the taxpayers are directly responsible,” the assessment of punitive
damages on a municipality would be appropriate. Id. However, it did not
indicate a means to establish when a taxpayer is directly responsible or how
many taxpayers would justify this measure. Significantly, the Court expressed
its belief that such a situation is “sufficiently unlikely” to occur; thus, it did
not have to anticipate these concerns. Id.
129
Due to the Court’s now obvious misjudgment of the likelihood of such
occurrences, subsequent courts lack the necessary guidance to determine the
boundaries of the Fact Concerts precedent. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s
deliberate notation that punitive damages would appropriately serve to deter
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defined in Fact Concerts, the First Circuit concluded that this
case did not fall within the Supreme Court’s caveat.130
Heritage Homes presents a perfect scenario in which the
deterrent objective of punitive damages, consistent with the
policy of § 1983, would be furthered by a finding of municipal
liability. Instead, the court’s reversal of the award of punitive
damages against the Seekonk Water District left the plaintiffs
without remedy.131 This decision, moreover, did not impose any
form of deterrence on the taxpayers who were responsible for
depriving the housing developer of his constitutionally protected
rights. While the court found it unlikely that a few responsible
voters would be deterred by the threat of punitive damages, the
purpose of § 1983, namely providing a broad federal remedy for
a deprivation of constitutionally protected rights, was undermined
because plaintiffs were denied both compensatory and punitive
damages.132 In Fact Concerts, the Court stated “[it had]
never . . . suggested that punishment is as prominent a purpose
under the statute as are compensation and deterrence.”133 Thus,
the complete denial of damages for a § 1983 violation under these
facts amounted to “an extreme situation where the taxpayers are
directly responsible for perpetrating an outrageous abuse of
constitutional rights.”134
abuses of constitutional rights “where taxpayers are directly responsible for
perpetrating an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights” has been
undermined. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29.
130
Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d at 2. The court stated that “[w]ithout a
more compelling showing, we have no doubt that the Court would reaffirm its
reasoning that ‘neither reason nor justice suggests that . . . retribution should
be visited upon the shoulders of blameless and unknowing taxpayers.’” Id.
(quoting Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267).
131
Id. at 1. The first time the appellate court heard this case it affirmed
the district court’s finding that Heritage Homes failed to prove compensatory
damages. Heritage Homes, 648 F.2d 761, 761 (1st Cir. 1981). This finding
was not challenged on writ of certiorari; therefore, on remand from the
Supreme Court, the appellate court only addressed the award of punitive
damages. Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d 1, 1 (1982).
132
Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d at 2.
133
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 268.
134
Id. at 267 n.29.
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B. Webster v. City of Houston135
The Fifth Circuit similarly held that footnote 29 does not
provide an exception to the bar against punitive damages from
municipalities under the facts of Webster.136 In that case, a § 1983
action was brought by the parents of a seventeen-year-old boy
who was shot and killed by the Houston police following a car
chase, despite the fact that he was unarmed and attempting to
surrender.137 Since the crime scene appeared suspicious because
the boy was shot while unarmed, officers at the scene attempted
to cover their tracks by placing a gun near the boy’s body.138 At
trial, it was revealed that the police department had an unwritten
policy of carrying “throw-downs,”139 guns or knives to be placed
near suspects who had been shot in unclear circumstances.140 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the award of punitive damages
assessed against the City of Houston based upon the reasoning
that this crime was not outrageous enough to fall within the
exception provided for in footnote 29.141
In a concurring opinion, Judge Goldberg regretfully
acknowledged that the court was bound by the precedent
established in Fact Concerts.142 He was compelled to write
separately because, if he agreed with the majority that there was
an exception in footnote 29 for “egregious cases,” 143 this case
would, in his opinion, surely fall within its ambit.144 Under his
135

689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1229-30.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 1220-23.
139
Id. at 1224.
140
Id. at 1223.
141
Id. at 1229.
142
Webster, 689 F.2d at 1230 (Goldberg. J., specially concurring) (“It is
with considerable grief that I write to specially concur in the result denying
punitive damages against the City of Houston.”).
143
Id. at 1231.
144
Id. (“If there were any narrow gap around [Fact Concerts] for an
egregious case, this one would slip through; I am aghast at the thought that
any violation of constitutional rights more appalling, more threatening than the
136
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interpretation of Fact Concerts, however, an “impenetrable
barrier to punitive damages”145 had been erected.
Judge Goldberg felt that the analysis the Supreme Court used
to establish that punitive damages were inappropriate against the
City of Newport compels a different result when applied to the
facts of Webster.146 While the retributive purpose of punitive
damages is not served when the economic burden of an
unconstitutional action falls on blameless taxpayers, the deterrent
purpose of punitive damages is fulfilled when a city is subjected
to punitive damages as a result of certain circumstances, such as
those in Webster.147
Several notable differences are apparent between Webster and
Fact Concerts. First, there is a difference between the actors.
Individual officials were responsible for the action taken in Fact
Concerts, while the official policy of the police department was
to blame for the action taken in Webster.148 Second, the ability to
sanction the offending officials plays a large role. The Court in
Fact Concerts concluded that punitive damages were not
necessary to deter the individual conduct of Newport’s officials;
superiors would likely take action by sanctioning the
misconduct.149 In contrast, the superiors of the police officers in
Webster could not be relied upon to sanction the officers’
misconduct because they were implicitly responsible, by means
of their collective inaction, to stop this unconstitutional
departmental policy.150 While not necessary to deter individual
misconduct, punitive damages would have been an effective
means to deter group or municipal conduct, as was the case in
Webster. Third, in Fact Concerts the Court believed that the
damages should be assessed against those individuals directly

one that occurred here might actually exist.”).
145
Id. at 1231.
146
Id. at 1231-32.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 1233.
149
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 269.
150
Webster, 689 F.2d at 1236 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring).
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responsible for the harm.151 When there is an unwritten policy,
however, it is nearly impossible to single out those individuals
who are responsible for its implementation.152 Therefore, it is
unclear whether to punish those who acted under it, those who
taught it, or those who knew about it and did nothing.153
Moreover, in Fact Concerts the Court expressed fear that an
assessment of punitive damages would deprive citizens of other
benefits or services because of the resulting financial burden
placed on the municipality.154 Conversely, in a case such as
Webster, this is exactly what Congress intended.155 Judge
Goldberg reasoned that “[i]t is necessary that the threatened
damages cause some deprivation for the populace so that they
will be nudged out of their blissful ignorance, ‘and the effect will
be most wholesome.’”156
Finally, a police policy of using throw-downs is more
offensive to the underlying goals in § 1983 than is a municipal
breach of contract.157 The distinctions between the cases clearly
demonstrate the need for punitive damages to punish and deter
municipalities from supporting unconstitutional behavior.
C. Ciraolo v. New York158
Following a complaint from her neighbor,159 Debra Ciraolo
151

Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 270. “The Court previously has found,
with respect to such violations, that a damages remedy recoverable against
individuals is more effective as a deterrent than the threat of damages against a
government employer.” Carlson v. Green, 466 U.S. 14, 21 (1980).
152
Webster, 689 F.2d at 1236 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring)
(suggesting that the policy at issue in Webster could not be traced to any
specific individuals, but instead was a function of “the outgrowth of the
collective inaction of the entire police department”).
153
Id. at 1237 (addressing a problem with the Court’s suggestion in Fact
Concerts that damages assessed directly against the offending officials are a
better deterrent than those assessed against the municipality).
154
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267.
155
Webster, 689 F.2d at 1237 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring).
156
Id.
157
Id. at 1235.
158
216 F.3d at 240.
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was arrested for aggravated harassment in the second degree, a
misdemeanor.160 When she was brought to Central Booking at the
police station, two female Corrections Department employees
subjected her to a strip and body cavity search.161 The search of
Ciraolo was in accordance with an established New York City
policy that required all arrestees brought to the police station to
be “strip searched by the officer assigned to the search post.”162
Ciraolo brought suit under § 1983 against the city, the police
department, and the individual police officers involved in her
arrest and search.163 The district court concluded that the city’s
strip search policy was in contravention of the law of the
circuit164 and charged the jury that “punitive damages could be
awarded against the city if they found that the city had acted
maliciously or wantonly.”165 The jury concluded that the city had
violated Ciraolo’s rights when she was strip-searched and
awarded her compensatory and punitive damages.166 On appeal,
the city argued that the punitive damages award was foreclosed
by Fact Concerts,167 which granted municipalities immunity from

159

Id. at 237 (indicating that Ciraolo and her neighbor were involved in a
legal dispute).
160
Id.
161
Id. (describing the circumstances of the strip search where Ciraolo was
“ordered to strip naked and made to bend down and cough while she was
visually inspected”). Charges against Ciraolo were subsequently dismissed. Id.
After this experience, however, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
disorder, sought therapy and began taking antidepressants. Id.
162
Id. (referring to the New York City Correction Department “guidelines
[for] the acceptance of all Police Cases for the Manhattan Court Division”).
163
Id. at 238.
164
See supra note 5 (citing to Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.
1986), where the Second Circuit held it unlawful to subject a misdemeanor
arrestee to a strip search unless there is reasonable suspicion that the arrestee
possesses contraband).
165
Id.
166
See supra note 6 (stating the jury’s award).
167
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 238. It should be noted that the city did not
contest the district court’s holding that the strip-search policy violated the
established law of the Circuit. Id.
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punitive damages under § 1983.168
Strictly interpreting footnote 29, the Second Circuit in
Ciraolo followed the line of precedent established in Fact
Concerts, Heritage Homes and Webster.169 The court concluded
that the footnote would only apply in cases where there was a
close link between the taxpayers’ actions and the adoption of an
unconstitutional municipal policy.170 Therefore, although this case
exhibited an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights, the bar to
punitive damages was upheld.171 The court reasoned that while
New York City’s conduct was unconstitutional, the taxpayers
could not be held accountable for the police department’s
policy.172 The denial of punitive damages in this case, however,
is simply unjust.
The court admitted that there would be “salutary effects of
[assessing] punitive damages in a case such as this.”173 It has
been argued that “punitive damages should be assessed whenever
a tortfeasor has a significant likelihood of escaping liability.”174
In the instant case, New York City had, or should have had,
knowledge that its strip-search policy was unconstitutional.175
168

Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247.
See supra Parts I.C, III.A-B (detailing the Supreme Court’s finding in
Fact Concerts that municipalities are immune from punitive damage liability
under § 1983, and demonstrating the unjust results that the interpretation and
application of Fact Concerts has had on subsequent cases).
170
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241.
171
Id.
172
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241-42 (“[W]hile we emphatically deplore the
City’s conduct in adopting a policy that this Circuit had earlier clearly held
unconstitutional, the taxpayers cannot be held to be responsible for the policy
under the reasoning of Newport.”).
173
Id. at 242. See Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Commentary, Limiting Federal
Restrictions on State and Local Government, 33 VAL. U.L. REV. 33, 41
(1998) (noting that “[a]wards of punitive damages could cause elected officials
to take civil rights violations seriously, even absent large awards of
compensatory damages”).
174
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 244 (citing A. Polinsky & Steven Sharvell,
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 870, 888
(1998)).
175
See supra note 5 (citing Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, a Second Circuit
169
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Thus, it acted with blatant disregard of the law by subjecting
Ciraolo to a strip search of her person.176 While Ciraolo was
awarded minimal compensatory damages, the city effectively
escaped liability since it was immunized from punitive
damages.177 In addition, the Supreme Court noted that “[a] higher
ratio” of punitive to compensatory damages “may . . . be
justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect.”178 Thus,
in a case such as Ciraolo, the only way to deter the municipality
is to assess punitive damages.179
This case should have been decided under a broader
interpretation, following the spirit rather than the letter of
footnote 29. The circuit court, because it confined itself to the
wording of footnote 29, was unwilling to find taxpayers directly
responsible for the constitutional violation.180 The court viewed
the creation of footnote 29 as intending to further the retributive
goal of § 1983181 and was, therefore, cautious in applying the
footnote so as not to unfairly punish taxpayers.182 However, the
precedent for strictly construing the statute to require an
“immediate connection between the taxpayers’ behavior and the
case holding it unconstitutional to strip-search a person arrested on
misdemeanor charges without reasonable suspicion that the arrestee possess
contraband).
176
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 237-38.
177
See supra note 6 (illustrating the gross disparity between the
compensatory damage award of $19,645 that Ciraolo received and the punitive
damage award amounting to $5,000,000 that the Second Circuit invalidated).
178
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996).
179
See Gilles, supra note 108 (arguing that municipalities should
internalize the full costs of their constitutional violations and that the
“availability of punitive damages . . . will place unconstitutional policies and
customs on the radar screens of responsible officials”).
180
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 240-42.
181
Id. at 240. The retributive purpose of § 1983 was not furthered in the
case of Fact Concerts because the burden of punitive damages would have
fallen on the taxpayers. See Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267.
182
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241 (declining to apply footnote 29 because the
court faced what it considered to be a “common situation in which an
unconstitutional policy has been adopted by municipal officials without any
clear endorsement of the policy by the electorate”).
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unconstitutional municipal policy” is not firmly rooted.183 Not
only have the circuit courts differed in the interpretation of cases
premised on footnote 29,184 but Judge Goldberg stated that “he
believed the Supreme Court’s holding [in Fact Concerts] swept
too broadly, and was both unwarranted and unwise in a case like
Randy Webster’s.”185 The similarities in the Webster and Ciraolo
cases support the proposition that municipal immunity from
punitive damages should be reviewed.186 The application of the
Fact Concerts holding to these cases is contrary to the purposes
of § 1983.187
The Supreme Court has recognized that deterrence against
future constitutional violations is an important purpose of
§ 1983.188 This objective, however, is undermined when

183

Id. at 240.
See Webster, 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982); Heritage Homes, 670
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982). While the Fifth Circuit focused on the outrageousness
of the constitutional violation, the First Circuit held that the taxpayers
involvement was the deciding aspect in determining whether punitive damages
could be assessed. Webster, 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982); Heritage Homes,
670 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982). Furthermore, Judge Goldberg’s concurring
opinion in Webster took a third and different perspective on footnote 29 and
found that no exception was created. Webster, 689 F.2d at 1231 (Goldberg, J.,
specially concurring).
185
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 241 (citing Judge Goldberg’s concurring opinion
in Webster, 689 F.2d at 1231-32).
186
Webster and Ciraolo are similar in that they both involve an
unconstitutional police policy and a violation of Fourth Amendment rights.
The same distinctions that Judge Goldberg drew between Webster and Fact
Concerts may also be made as between Ciraolo and Fact Concerts. See supra
Part III.B.
187
See generally Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242-50 (Calabresi, J., concurring);
Webster, 689 F.2d at 1230-39 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring).
188
See Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 266-67 (stating that, by definition,
punitive damages serve as a means to punish and deter the tortfeasor and
others from similar conduct); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 at
651-52 (1980) (suggesting that “[t]he knowledge that a municipality will be
liable for all of its injurious conduct . . . should create an incentive for
officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their intended actions
to err on the side of protecting citizens’ constitutional rights”).
184
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municipalities are held immune from punitive damages.189 Since
the behavior of a municipality is likely to be influenced to some
extent when it is forced to bear the costs associated with its
behavior, assessing punitive damages against a municipality
would serve as an effective deterrent.190
In Ciraolo, Judge Calabresi stated that “[p]unitive damages
can ensure that a wrongdoer bears all the costs of its actions, and
is thus appropriately deterred from causing harm, in those
categories of cases in which compensatory damages alone result
in systematic underassessment of costs, and hence in systematic
underdeterrence.”191 Thus, when a rational actor192 determines
whether or not to undertake an activity based on a “cost-benefit
analysis,”193 the risk of underdeterrence is high when that actor
reaps the advantages but does not bear the costs of its actions.194
While compensatory damages, when promoting an accurate
189

Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 249 n.11 (Calabresi, J., concurring). In Amato v.
Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311 (2d Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit
acknowledged the importance of affixing fault on municipalities through
punitive damages. The court stated:
Perhaps even more important to society, however, is the ability to
hold a municipality accountable where official policy or custom has
resulted in the deprivation of constitutional rights. A judgment against
a municipality not only holds that entity responsible for its actions and
inactions, but also can encourage the municipality to reform the
patterns and practices that led to constitutional violations, as well as
alert the municipality and its citizenry to the issue. In short, finding
against the officers in their individual capacities does not serve all the
purposes of, and is not the equivalent of, a judgment against the
municipality.
Id. at 317-18.
190
See Owen, 445 U.S. at 652 n.34 (stating that “one must wonder
whether this entire litigation would have been necessary had the [Independence
City] Council members thought that the city might be liable for their
misconduct”).
191
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
192
Id. Judge Calabresi noted that Fact Concerts and § 1983 are premised
on the assumption that a municipality does not always act rationally. Id. at 243
n.1.
193
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 243 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
194
Id.
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“cost-benefit analysis,”195 can provide an adequate means of
deterrence,196 there are other cases where the costs are not
sufficiently represented.197 As Judge Calabresi noted, “[c]osts
may not be sufficiently represented in compensatory damages for
several reasons, most of which go to the fact that not all injured
parties are in fact compensated by the responsible injurer.”198
When only compensatory damages are assessed, an injured party
may be unable to, or may choose not to sue.199 The consequence
of providing municipalities with immunity from punitive
damages, therefore, undermines the deterrence aspect underlying
§ 1983.
It is evident from a more thorough understanding of the
reasons behind § 1983’s enactment that municipal immunity from
punitive damages should be re-examined. In 1871, the Civil
Rights Act was enacted in response to the failure of state and
local governments to protect the constitutional rights of its
citizens.200 Yet, today, nearly 150 years later, there are still city
police departments freely violating the constitutionally protected
rights of its citizens.201 This occurs even when the established law
of the circuit states that a police department’s policy is illegal.
Because of this complete defiance of the law, courts should

195

Id. at 242 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
Id. at 243 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. (“[A] victim may not realize that she has been harmed by a
particular actor’s conduct, or may not be able to identify the person or entity
who has injured her.”) See, e.g., Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 243-44 (Calabresi, J.,
concurring) (noting that the lack of compensation is reflected in an evaluation
of the “time, effort, and stress associated with bringing a lawsuit,” as
compared with “the compensation she can expect to receive”); Polinsky &
Sharvell, supra note 174, at 888 (explaining that someone may not bring a suit
“if the costs and value of the time and effort he would have to devote to the
suit exceed the expected gain” or if the likelihood of establishing causation is
low).
200
See supra notes 28, 33 and accompanying text (explaining the
circumstances that compelled Congress to enact § 1983).
201
See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 236.
196
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interpret footnote 29 less strictly than they have to date.202 The
legislative history suggests that § 1983 should be broadly
construed.203 Yet footnote 29 has been narrowly read,204 thus
limiting the application of a meaningful remedy for a § 1983
violation.205
While the Court has feared that municipalities will be unable
to financially sustain the burden of punitive damages, such a risk
to their “financial integrity” would only be prevalent when
“government employees and agents regularly engage in serious
violations of civil rights.”206 A municipality facing the prospect
of punitive damages would take the civil rights of its citizens
more seriously.207
Furthermore, the distinction the Court draws between the
ability of municipal officials and municipalities to handle an
assessment of punitive damages is weakened by state statutes on
indemnity.208 Since municipal officials in their individual
202

See Michael Wells, Punitive Damages for Constitutional Torts, 56 LA.
L. REV. 841, 852 (1996) (arguing for a flexible interpretation of statutes to
conform to the current society’s issues).
203
See supra note 29 and accompanying text (referring to comments by
legislators describing their intent in enacting § 1983).
204
See supra Part III (analyzing the three cases where the courts declined
to find footnote 29 applicable and, thus, denied or reversed the award of
punitive damages against municipalities).
205
Society will benefit from municipalities being subject to a punitive
damages remedy. Punitive damages provide a meaningful remedy when the
plaintiff would otherwise not bring a § 1983 action. See supra note 199 and
accompanying text. They also insure that municipalities act to protect, not
violate, our constitutional rights. See Gilles, supra note 108; see generally
Wells, supra note 202 (arguing that punitive damages assessed against a
municipality are necessary to deter constitutional violations and that
compensatory damages “ignore or undervalue the nonmonetary nature of most
constitutional rights”).
206
Bodensteiner, supra note 173, at 41 (arguing that there should be a
serious risk to the “financial integrity of a municipal entity that tolerates
and/or encourages official lawlessness”).
207
Id. (suggesting that the threat of punitive damages to be paid by the
municipality would cause elected officials to act more responsibly and consider
the civil rights of citizens).
208
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 249 n.11 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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capacities are not insulated from punitive damage liability, the
city is essentially footing the bill for punitive damages when it
indemnifies its employees.209 Therefore, if it is permissible for
municipalities to pay punitive damages for purposes of
indemnification, they should not be immune from paying punitive
damages for their own liability.210
The denial of punitive damages against New York City
cannot be justified under the “two part approach” the Court
relied on in Fact Concerts.211 First, the legislative history
pertaining to § 1983 and the common law of municipal liability
are severely undermined by New York City’s policy of
indemnifying its municipal officials.212 The concern that punitive
damages would financially burden local governments loses
considerable strength in light of this practice.213 Moreover, the
taxpayers ultimately end up footing the bill, despite the Court’s
concern that they should only pay when “directly responsible”
for the abuse of constitutional rights.214
Second, the policies underlying both § 1983 and punitive
damages are clearly unfulfilled by the result in Ciraolo.215 The
city not only escaped punishment under this holding, but was also
209

Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 30, 41, 51 (holding that where a defendant
has acted recklessly or with callous disregard for the plaintiff’s rights, punitive
damages can be obtained).
210
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 249 n.11 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
211
453 U.S. at 259, 266. The “two part approach” refers to the Court’s
examination of the common-law background of § 1983 and then its public
policy considerations.
212
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 249 n.11 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
213
Indemnity is defined as:
Reimbursement or compensation for loss, damage, or liability in tort;
esp., the right of a party who is secondarily liable to recover from the
party who is primarily liable for reimbursement of expenditures paid
to a third party for injuries resulting from a violation of a commonlaw duty.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 772 (17th ed. 1999).
214
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29.
215
See supra Parts I.A, III.C (discussing the policies behind § 1983 and
punitive damages and analyzing them in relation to the court’s holding in
Ciraolo).
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undeterred from behaving in an unconstitutional manner in the
future.216 It is inconceivable that the police department’s actions,
which clearly violated the constitutional rights of its citizens, and
disregarded the established law in the circuit, have gone
unpunished.217 Deterrence should be of foremost importance
when an established policy in a municipal department violates the
constitutional rights of its citizens.218 The lack of action taken
against the city indicates that the court implicitly accepts the
police department’s behavior.219 Section 1983 was enacted to
prevent unconstitutional actions taken “under the color of law,”220
where citizens are denied their rights and not protected by their
city.221 The legislative history of § 1983 unquestionably
admonishes the behavior of the police department in Ciraolo and
compels an assessment of punitive damages on the city. Unless
the Supreme Court revisits footnote 29, future municipal policymakers will not be deterred from violating the established laws of
their judicial circuits in these situations.
216

See Schnapper, supra note 47 at 245 (stating that “[a]ny construction of
section 1983 which significantly reduces the likelihood that a city will be held
responsible in damages for municipal policies will tend to frustrate [the
deterrence] purpose of section 1983”). See generally Wells, supra note 202
(arguing that in order to promote deterrence of constitutional violations, the
Supreme Court should lift the restrictions it placed on the availability of
punitive damages under Fact Concerts).
217
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 242-50 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (arguing that
the result the majority reached in this case is incongruous with the purposes
underlying § 1983).
218
Id. at 242, 250 (noting that the Court in Fact Concerts and Owen
recognized that the purpose of § 1983 is to deter against future constitutional
violations, and concluding that “the prospect of damages awarded pursuant to
the statute manifestly fails to deter a municipality from adopting a policy that
it clearly knows or should know violates the Fourth Amendment”).
219
Granting a municipality immunity from punitive damages, in the face
of a clear violation of § 1983, contradicts the reason for which it was enacted.
See supra Part I.A.
220
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). “In cases under § 1983, ‘under color’ of law
has consistently been treated as the same thing as the ‘state action’ required
under the Fourteenth Amendment.” United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794
n.7 (1966).
221
See supra Part I.A (discussing the legislative history behind § 1983).
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IV. PROPOSAL TO MODIFY FOOTNOTE 29
The Supreme Court’s failure to provide a test or an adequate
means of assessing when municipal action should be subject to
punitive damages under footnote 29 has led to the protection of
municipal policies and behaviors that are clearly unconstitutional.
Moreover, the Act was specifically designed to protect against
municipal conduct of this sort. The Court stated in footnote 29
that not only did the facts of the case not present an “extreme
situation,” but also that “such an occurrence [was] sufficiently
unlikely that we need not anticipate it here.”222 The unfortunate
reality is that such extreme situations have occurred. Ciraolo and
Webster presented the perfect scenarios to which the exception
should have been applied.223 The Supreme Court should modify
footnote 29 in light of the split in the circuits regarding its
applicability and the painfully written concurring opinions of two
well-respected judges.224
One way the Supreme Court could modify footnote 29, so as
222

Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29.
See Ciraolo, 216 F.2d at 242-60 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Webster,
689 F.2d 1230-39 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring).
224
See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 250 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring);
Webster, 689 F.2d at 1230-31 (Calabresi, J., concurring). Judge Goldberg
wrote:
It is with considerable grief that I write to specifically concur in the
result denying punitive damages against the City of Houston . . . I am
aghast at the thought that any violation of constitutional rights more
appalling, more threatening than the one that occurred here might
actually exist [it is] with troubled human conscience [that] I concur in
this unfortunate result.
Id. at 1230-31. Judge Calabresi also wrote separately, concurring with the
result in Ciraolo:
I respectfully suggest that the purpose of § 1983, to protect federal
constitutional rights against infringement by state actors, is not served
when—as in the case before us—the prospect of damages awarded
pursuant to the statute manifestly fails to deter a municipality from
adopting a policy that it clearly knows or should know violates the
Fourth Amendment.
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 250.
223
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to further the policies of § 1983, is to impose punitive damages
on a municipality when it has utterly disregarded a prior ruling
by its own judicial circuit or by the United States Supreme
Court.225 This proposed standard is consistent with the legislative
history and the policies underlying § 1983.226 In Monell, the
Supreme Court declined to hold local governments responsible
under a strict liability theory since Congress rejected the Sherman
Amendment.227 The Court, however, left undefined the scope of a
municipality’s duty of protection under § 1983. While not
directed at municipal liability, the amendment228 adopted in place
of the Sherman Amendment suggests Congress’ intent pertaining
to the duty of protection.229 It sets forth three guidelines for
municipal liability: 1) knowledge or notice of a potential
constitutional violation; 2) neglect or refusal to act when in
power to do so; and 3) failure to exercise reasonable diligence to
prevent the harm.230 Application of these three factors to the
proposed modification of footnote 29 indicates that a municipality
should clearly be held liable when it disregards the established
law.231 First, a municipality that violates a prior ruling applicable
to it has the requisite knowledge that its actions are

225

This proposal does not require the Supreme Court to overrule Fact
Concerts or any other case it has decided. Simply stated, it calls for applying
footnote 29 to comport with the framers’ intent when they created § 1983. See
supra Part I.A (discussing the legislative history behind § 1983). Clearly the
Court foresaw a necessity to create an exception to its sweeping holding in
Fact Concerts, otherwise it would have been unnecessary to have created the
footnote in the first place. See Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29.
226
See supra Part I.A (providing an overview of the legislative history of
§ 1983).
227
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. at 694. The Court stated that
“a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for any injury inflicted
solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a
government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as
an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id.
228
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat. 13.
229
Ballen, supra note 32, at 318.
230
Ballen, supra note 32, at 318.
231
Ballen, supra note 32, at 318.
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unconstitutional.232 Second, that municipality possesses fault for
its actions by refusing or neglecting to prevent the constitutional
violation when it was capable of doing so.233 Third, the
municipality fails to “exercise reasonable diligence”234 in
preventing the constitutional violation. Moreover, the only way
to fulfill the deterrent rationale of § 1983, when the municipality
has disregarded a prior judicial ruling, is with punitive damages.
It is not feasible that a municipality would be deterred by an
injunction or contempt sanction because it is unlikely that the
individual bringing the suit would be subject to the same conduct
in the future.235 Moreover, these remedies are applicable only to
the plaintiff seeking them and would fail to prevent other
individuals from being subjected to identical constitutional
violations.236 Thus, the legislative history and policies underlying
§ 1983 support the proposition that the only way to deter a
municipality that knowingly disregards a prior ruling by its own
232

In Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the Supreme
Court held that, apart from decisions that clearly break from precedent,
municipalities are responsible for anticipating developments in the law. See
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 185 (1990)
(analyzing Owen to determine whether a decision should be applied
retroactively). Considering that the Supreme Court upheld the imposition of
retroactive liability on a municipality for violating subsequent developments in
the law, it is fair to hold a municipality liable for actions it takes in knowing
violation of the law. Id. (stating that the determination in Owen “makes
municipalities, like private individuals, responsible for anticipating
developments in the law”).
233
See supra note 232.
234
See supra note 232.
235
Judge Calabresi noted that the doctrine of standing would prevent a
§ 1983 plaintiff from seeking an injunction because of the difficulty in
establishing the likelihood of being subjected to the same constitutional
violation in the future. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 248. See also Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983) (denying an injunction against police
chokeholds because the plaintiff had only been injured once by such conduct,
and thus lacked standing). It should also be noted that class action lawsuits
only have a limited deterrent impact on unconstitutional municipal conduct.
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 248. Therefore, they should not be relied upon to combat
underdeterrence. Id.
236
See supra note 235 (discussing the effect of standing).
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judicial circuit or by the Supreme Court is by imposing punitive
damages.237
The Court’s premise for denying punitive damages as a
remedy in actions brought against municipalities is flawed.238 The
Court expressed concern about the fact that the burden of
punitive damages would fall on the innocent taxpayers.239
However, the Court’s contention is premised “on an assumption
that the municipality and the taxpayers who compose it are
wholly distinct entities—an assumption that, as courts have
recognized in the case of corporations, cannot withstand close
scrutiny.”240 Thus, a municipality, like a corporation, will be
deterred by punitive damages because the taxpayers will likely
express their displeasure with its actions, as shareholders would,
and cause the city to comply with constitutional standards.241 To
ensure that the legislative aims and policies encompassing § 1983
will be upheld, it is time the Court reconsiders footnote 29.

237

See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 250 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (urging that
deterrence is necessary to uphold the purpose of § 1983 where a municipality
adopts a policy “that it clearly knows or should know violates the Fourth
Amendment”).
238
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 268-69 (expressing concern that municipal
officials would not be deterred by the potential imposition of punitive damages
that would be footed by the taxpayers).
239
Id. at 267 (“Neither reason nor justice suggests that such retribution
[such as an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services] should be
visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers.”).
240
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 249 (Calebresi, J., concurring).
Thus, in Fischer v. Johns-Manville, 103 N.J. 643, 512 A.2d 466
(1986), the New Jersey Supreme Court, upholding an award of
punitive damages against an asbestos manufacturer, rejected
defendant’s argument that punitive damages “unfairly punish[ed]
innocent shareholders” and declined its invitation to draw a
distinction between a corporation and its shareholders, pointing out
that shareholders have the power to affect corporate action.
Id. at 476 (quoting Justice Blackmun) (emphasis in original).
241
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 249 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (noting that the
threat that taxpayers will be unhappy when they have to pay more and get less
in return directly impacts the political considerations of a city such as the
power to tax and to stay in office).
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Further modification of footnote 29, in accordance with the
purposes of § 1983, should include an exceptionally egregious
standard. The Fifth Circuit has suggested that conduct rising to
an “outrageous” level would warrant the imposition of punitive
damages on municipalities under footnote 29.242 Without a
standard with which to measure the conduct, however, the court
in Webster declined to fit the facts within the footnote’s
exception.243 Deterrence of official misconduct is a primary
purpose of § 1983;244 therefore, the Supreme Court should define
egregious official conduct and modify footnote 29 to include that
standard as an exception to municipal immunity from punitive
damages. The Court determined that it was appropriate to apply
the “shocks the conscience”245 test to uphold an individual’s right
to due process protection from arbitrary governmental actions.246
Similarly, § 1983 serves to prevent individuals from being
subjected to official action taken “under the color of law.”247
Thus, it would be appropriate to apply the “shocks the
conscience” test as a means to evaluate the exceptionally
egregious standard.
The foundation for applying the “shocks the conscience” test
has been established in several Supreme Court decisions.248 This
242

Webster, 689 F.2d at 1229-30.
Id.
244
See supra Part I.A-B (examining the deterrent effect that § 1983 is
intended to invoke).
245
The Supreme Court first applied this test in Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (reversing the conviction of the petitioner based on the
conduct of the police officers in securing the conviction, which was found to
“shock the conscience” and thus offend the Due Process Clause).
246
See Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (holding that the
“shocks the conscience” test was applicable to determine whether a high-speed
police chase, resulting in the death of the plaintiff, was a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process).
247
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
248
See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 833; Rochin, 342 U.S. at 165. But cf.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1977) (rejecting the “shocks the
conscience” test and instead adopting an objective test to protect those rights
that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . and implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty”).
243
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test should be used as a starting point to assess whether the
official conduct in question warrants municipal immunity from
punitive damages.249 To determine whether official action has
reached a “shocking” level, the Court has emphasized that
attention be given to the time and opportunity the official had to
deliberate prior to taking action.250 Situations of high pressure, in
which an immediate decision is required, raise the threshold of
shocking conduct.251 Incorporating an exceptionally egregious
standard into footnote 29 would provide a means for courts to
determine which fact patterns demand punitive damages, thereby
fulfilling the purpose of § 1983. As Judge Goldberg noted,
“social costs of the gravest nature” result when we protect the
police department, which instead of protecting us from violence,
inflicts violence upon us.252 He further stated, “[i]t is only by
threat of punitive damages that we can be sure policymakers will
be cognizant of this grave social cost.”253 Footnote 29 is dictum
and, therefore, should not be interpreted inflexibly so as to
unconditionally immunize municipalities from punitive damages.
Exoneration of official misconduct undermines § 1983. To
remedy this, footnote 29 should be modified to include the
249

Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850. Note that the “shocks the conscience” test is
used as a means to assist the Court in determining whether there was a
violation of due process, rather than as a hard and fast rule. Id. at 847. Justice
Kennedy pointed out that the “shocks the conscience” test is highly subjective,
and that the Court should objectively determine whether the conduct is
consistent with the accepted and required action in question. Id. at 857
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
250
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853. The Court acknowledged that certain positions
or situations afford officials more time than others to think before they act:
When such extended opportunities to do better are teamed with
protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly shocking. But
when unforseen circumstances demand an officer’s instant judgment,
even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful
purpose to spark the shock that implicates “the large concerns of the
governors and the governed.”
Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)).
251
Id. at 854.
252
Id.
253
Id.
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exceptionally egregious standard as described above.
V.

CONCLUSION

The bar to the assessment of punitive damages on
municipalities found liable of unconstitutional conduct should be
reconsidered by the Supreme Court. Modification of footnote 29,
so that it comports with the policies and purposes of § 1983,
would not require the Court to overrule Fact Concerts,254 but
should set out a standard with which to apply it. Municipal
immunity from punitive damages presents an obstacle in certain
cases to the realization of the objectives of § 1983. The Supreme
Court has stated that, while there is a higher threshold for review
in the area of statutory interpretation as compared to
constitutional interpretation,255 a precedent becomes more
vulnerable when it “has been found to be inconsistent with the
sense of justice or with the social welfare.”256 Today, municipal
immunity from punitive damages in certain § 1983 actions has
resulted in outcomes that can be classified as unjust and contrary
to social welfare.257 In Heritage Homes, the municipality’s
immunity from punitive damages not only left the plaintiffs
without a remedy, but also left the perpetrators of the

254

Therefore, considerations of stare decisis do not present a problem for
the Court. When faced with the question, for example, of whether to overrule
the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, adopted by the Court in Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), Justice Kennedy stated that overruling a
statutory interpretation requires a “special justification” because of the
considerations of stare decisis. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164 (1989).
255
See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172-73. Justice Kennedy stated that
“considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory
interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation,
the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we
have done.” Id.
256
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting B.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921)).
257
See, e.g., Ciraolo, 216 F.3d 236; Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d 1;
Webster, 689 F.2d 1220.
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unconstitutional action undeterred.258 The injustice created by
municipal immunity from punitive damages is further exemplified
by the exoneration of the unconstitutional police department
policy of using “throw downs” in Webster.259 The result in
Webster directly contradicts the purpose of § 1983 because it
effectively condones the police department’s policy of violating
the constitutional rights of its citizens.
Finally, footnote 29 compels modification when applied to the
facts of Ciraolo.260 At the very least, a municipality should be
liable for punitive damages when it knowingly violates not only
the law established in its judicial circuit, but also the Federal
Constitution. If there is no action taken to punish cities when they
breach the law, then the law itself and the values it promotes are
severely undermined. Compensatory damages are not enough to
deter municipalities from violating § 1983. In accordance with
applying a broad construction of § 1983, footnote 29 should,
therefore, be modified. Only then will the courts fully realize the
purpose and spirit of the statute and once again provide remedies
to those who are deprived of their constitutional rights.

258

See Heritage Homes, 670 F.2d 1. As noted by the Supreme Court in
Fact Concerts, prevention of future misconduct is a fundamental objective of
punitive damages, and the underlying goal of § 1983 is to deter future abuses
of power. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 268. Thus, the denial of punitive
damages in Heritage Homes is counterproductive.
259
See 689 F.2d at 1230-38 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring).
260
See supra Part III.C (analyzing the Second Circuit’s interpretation of
footnote 29 and explaining the unjust result the court reached).

